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Conservative assumptions in medical ethics risk immense
harms during a pandemic. Public health institutions and pub-
lic discourse alike have repeatedly privileged inaction over
aggressive medical interventions to address the pandemic,
perversely increasing population-wide risks while claiming
to be guided by “caution”. This puzzling disconnect between
rhetoric and reality is suggestive of an underlying philosoph-
ical confusion. In this paper, I argue that we have been misled
by status quo bias—exaggerating the moral significance of the
risks inherent in medical interventions, while systematically
neglecting the (objectively greater) risks inherent in the status
quo prospect of an out-of-control pandemic. By coming to
appreciate the possibility and significance of status quo risk,
we will be better prepared to respond appropriately when the
next pandemic strikes.
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Conservative assumptions in medical ethics risk immense harms
during a pandemic, even if they serve us well enough in ordinary
times. Public health institutions and public discourse alike have re-
peatedly privileged inaction over aggressive medical interventions
to address the pandemic, perversely increasing population-wide
risks while claiming to be guided by “caution”. This puzzling dis-
connect between rhetoric and reality is suggestive of an underlying
philosophical confusion. In this paper, I argue that we have been
misled by a kind of status quo bias1—overweighting the significance
of the risks inherent in medical interventions, while systematically
neglecting the (objectively greater) risks inherent in the status quo
prospect of an out-of-control pandemic.2
Sec. 1 sets out a possible justification for conservative medical
regulations in ordinary contexts, and explains why it reverses in a
pandemic. Sec. 2 applies this lesson to explain why various policy
1I use this broad term because the precise nature of the cognitive bias involved
is not important for my purposes. But it is plausibly the same phenomenon
described as ‘omission bias’ in Ritov and Baron (1992): favouring “harmful omis-
sions over equally [or more] harmful commissions”, without good reason. See
also Ritov and Baron (1990).
2The ‘status quo prospect’ is the range of possibilities (weighted by their respec-
tive probabilities) that could be expected to happen if the particular intervention
under consideration is not implemented.
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responses to the pandemic that were presented as being under-
taken “from an abundance of caution” were in fact objectively
reckless with people’s lives—and, conversely, why alternative re-
sponses that intuitively strike many as seeming “reckless” are better
understood as objectively prudent. Expanding upon this theme,
sec. 3 defends Human Challenge Trials and other controversial
methods for speeding immunity research early in a pandemic, and
sec. 4 makes the case for a controversial policy of pursuing targeted
immunity where it is most needed, early in a pandemic. Sec. 5
explores the ethical significance of “vaccine hesitancy” as a reason
against fast-tracking vaccine access. Finally, sec. 6 addresses the
common assumption that medical experts are the only relevant
experts for determining pandemic policy.
1 The Asymmetry of Risk
Autonomy-restricting medical regulations (that bar access to
untested or experimental treatments and candidate vaccines) are
sometimes justified on grounds of harm-minimization. This
justification requires that the regulations protect the public from
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risks of harmful side-effects—such as those that emerged in
the Thalidomide scandal—sufficient to outweigh the potential
benefits of the barred medical interventions. I take no stand
here on whether this attempted justification is in fact typically
successful;3 my claim is just that if autonomy-restricting medical
regulations are to be ordinarily justified, this would seem the best
available explanation. Regulators may argue that, in ordinary
circumstances, the status quo is relatively safe and so untested
medical innovations are riskier than the status quo. Until they are
proven safe and effective, it may be reasonable to assume that
the potential risks of untested products outweigh their potential
benefits, and so block public access to such products until they
pass stringent testing requirements.
Even this argument does not support privileging the status
quo as a matter of principle. Rather, the suggestion is just that
if we’re already in a tolerably good state to begin with, highly
uncertain gambles may be disadvantageous in expectation, with
the potential harms outweighing the potential for reducing status
quo risk. Of course, that antecedent assumption—that there’s
3Cf., e.g., Peltzman (1973) for classical skepticism about the value of the FDA.
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little status quo risk to alleviate—may be questionable even in
ordinary circumstances.4 But the crucial point for our purposes
is just that the argument is restricted in scope to specific contexts
in which the status quo is relatively safe. In different contingent
circumstances, such as those of an out-of-control pandemic, any
sensible underlying normative principle will recommend very
different practical responses.5
A pandemic reverses the usual asymmetry of risk. Now it is
the status quo that is immensely dangerous, and a typical sort of
medical intervention (such as an experimental drug or vaccine) is
comparatively less so. As a result, we should expect to find many
cases in which the potential benefits of innovation outweigh the
potential risks. Doing nothing new, and allowing the pandemic to
continue unabated, should be recognized as a far riskier prospect—
for many individuals, and especially for society at large—than
trying experimental or otherwise uncertain solutions for which
the risks are orders of magnitude lower than the risk otherwise
4It seems implausible for patients suffering from terminal illnesses, for ex-
ample, and the Right to Try Act of 2017 accordingly carves out an exception for
such patients.
5This is true whether our underlying principle is strictly risk-neutral, like
utilitarianism, or an alternative that’s robustly risk-averse and gives extra weight
to avoiding worse outcomes—cf. Buchak (2013).
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posed by the virus.
For example, scientists may know enough about the general
properties of an experimental vaccine to expect that it would have
a low chance of serious side-effects, while judging that it offers a
decent chance of protection against the rampaging virus. People,
especially those at high risk of exposure and/or high risk of serious
illness from the virus, could then reasonably judge that trying the
experimental vaccine offers them better health prospects than
waiting and remaining vulnerable to the virus with certainty. In
such a situation, regulatory obstacles unjustifiably violate both
individual autonomy and harm-minimization.
The case for medical liberalization in pandemic circumstances
is greatly strengthened when we take into account the societal
value of information. By tracking the outcomes for those who
try experimental vaccines, for example, we could sooner confirm
their safety and efficacy, thereby encouraging broader adoption
and slowing the pandemic’s spread much sooner than has actually
been the case.6 The total societal cost of an ongoing pandemic
6As Magnus (2020) cautions, carelessly implemented emergency authoriza-
tions risk undermining clinical trials. So it would be essential that priority access
be given to those willing to participate in clinical trials (Webb, Shah, and Lynch
2020). Indeed, one way to implement the needed liberalization would simply
be to offer massively expanded clinical trials, funded by participants themselves
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is so immense that we will typically have overwhelmingly strong
reasons to support any policy that could feasibly bring it to an
end sooner (so long as this doesn’t entail a symmetrical risk of
extending the pandemic or causing comparably significant harms).
So it bears emphasizing that whenever the risk to individuals of
pharmacological side-effects is lower than the status quo risk they
are otherwise exposed to in the ongoing pandemic, the societal risk
from such side-effects will typically be entirely negligible. After
all, unlike the virus, blood clots (and other possible side-effects)
aren’t contagious.7
This all creates a strong presumption in favour of expanding
access to untested or experimental treatments and candidate vac-
cines in the context of a pandemic. In order to justify continuing
such prohibitions in a pandemic, government agencies ought to
present a cost-benefit analysis showing that the consensus opinion
of medical experts implies that the harm from potential side-
effects straightforwardly outweighs (in expectation) the benefit
of potential protection against the pandemic. When the status
quo is so inherently risky, it is no longer justifiable to privilege
if necessary.
7Though “vaccine hesitancy” may be—cf. sec. 5.
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the status quo by default. A positive case must be made on its
behalf. In the absence of a positive case for judging the status
quo to be definitively safer, reasons of autonomy and the value
of information-gathering together provide undefeated and unop-
posed reasons for preferring a more liberal policy.
2 Caution and Recklessness
The argument of my previous section suggests the need for radical
revisions to ordinary judgments about what constitutes caution and
recklessness in pandemic policy. People typically privilege inaction
by default, judging pauses to an intervention to be “cautious”, while
plowing ahead with an uncertain intervention is automatically
deemed to be the more “reckless” option. But of course it would
not be particularly prudent to sit still on the tracks while a train
hurtled towards you, even if the exit ladder was overdue for a safety
check.8 It all depends on how the risks from intervention compare
to the status quo risks. So if I’m right that the pandemic reverses
the usual asymmetric balance of risk, this should prompt us to also




reverse our usual judgments about prudence and recklessness.
Consider the Joint CDC and FDA Statement on Johnson & Johnson
COVID-19 Vaccine, responding to early indications that one in a
million vaccine recipients developed dangerous blood clots: “we
are recommending a pause in the use of this vaccine out of an
abundance of caution.”9 This echoes similar moves from many
European countries a few weeks earlier, suspending their use of the
AstraZeneca vaccine on similar grounds (albeit against the advice
of the European Medicines Agency and the World Health Orga-
nization). Especially for the European nations, with their limited
vaccine supply and slow roll-out in early 2021, this decision likely
increased the total death count. If so, it seems misleading to de-
scribe such recklessness towards the virus as constituting “caution”,
except in the pathological sense that someone irrationally terrified
of pinching their finger in the buckle could count as “cautious” of
wearing a seatbelt.
Pathologies aside, it should be clear that what normatively mat-
ters is assessing overall risk levels, and not just protecting against
9https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2021/s0413-JJ-vaccine.html, accessed
4/23/2021. At least other (Pfizer and Moderna) vaccines were available in the U.S.
during the pause. But my general point remains that reducing overall supply
at this crucial time was still reckless rather than cautious so far as risk from the
pandemic was concerned.
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one (comparatively minor) risk no matter the cost. With this cor-
rect understanding in mind, then, we can see that governments
and their agencies are not generally entitled to describe vaccine
suspensions as reflecting “an abundance of caution”, unless they
can show that the policy actually reduces overall risk. If it instead
increases overall risk, it would seem more objectively accurate to
describe such suspensions as “reckless”—as they would then reveal
a reckless disregard of the objectively greater threat posed by the
unchecked spread of the virus.
For another striking example, consider the following quote
from The Guardian: “Germany. . . was the first country to refuse to
allow people over the age of 65 to have the AstraZeneca vaccine
because of the absence of evidence of how well it worked in older
people, indicating a more cautious approach than most.”10 It is
objectively inaccurate to characterize as “cautious” a policy that
reduced vaccine access for the most vulnerable age group in the
midst of a pandemic.
The UK’s Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation




granting that “the benefits from vaccination are marginally
greater than the potential known harms,” noting that “the UK
public places a higher relative value on safety compared to
benefits.”11 But this contrast between “safety” and “benefits”
makes little sense when the benefits from vaccines are specifically
safety benefits, i.e. protection against the risks from Covid, not
enhancements above the baseline of good health. The choice
wasn’t between safety vs. benefits, but between safety vs. safety. So
the assessment of which risk was greater should be made fairly,
without rhetorically leaning on the scales in this way.
Finally, consider the debate from early 2021 over whether to
prioritize the timely delivery of second doses (as per US policy)
or to follow the British in delaying second doses in order to al-
low more of the population to sooner receive a first dose of the
vaccine.12 It seemed common to conceptualize the prioritization
of second doses as the “safe” option, even in the absence of cost-





12Kadire, Wachter, and Lurie (2021).
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risk from the virus.13 The alternative policy of “First Doses First”
was admittedly higher variance, in that it conceivably could have
yielded results that were either better or worse than the (more pre-
dictable) status quo.14 But lower variance does not by itself render
an option “safe”, as it may instead be invariably bad.15
Of course, some readers may judge these particular cases dif-
ferently. That’s fine—I don’t here mean to settle any empirical
disputes. My purpose in this section is instead to cast doubt on
conventional assumptions about what determines whether a policy
is “cautious” or “reckless”. My suggestion is that this cannot be
settled independently of the first-order disputes over the merits of
the competing policies. Rather than blindly favouring the status
quo as intrinsically “safe”, we should judge the safer option to be
13As evidence that this judgment stems from status quo bias, consider that,
had we planned on doing “First Doses First” from the start, it seems unlikely
that many would have been clamouring to change this to instead prioritize
second doses. The desirability of prioritizing second doses seems suspiciously
contingent on it being regarded as the status quo policy.
14Alex Tabarrok argues that this is actually a point in favour of FDF: higher
variance is a good thing in reversible decisions, since we could have continued on
if better than expected, and changed course if it turned out worse than expected.
(See the embedded video at https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolutio
n/2021/04/economics-in-one-virus.html, accessed 4/23/2021.)
15Again, it may be a reasonable heuristic to regard higher-variance options as
“riskier” when the status quo is itself tolerably safe, but as sec. 1 emphasized,
this is very much no longer the case during a pandemic. To revisit Persad’s
analogy, remaining on the train tracks is not the “safer” option, even if there’s
some chance that trying to escape via the service ladder could lead to an even
worse outcome—slipping and falling before being crushed by the oncoming train.
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whichever one best reduces overall risk. Specifically, I’ve argued that
(1) it would be a serious moral error to focus on a single source
or type of risk (neglecting greater overall risks) in making such
evaluations; and (2) we should be open to the possibility that a
higher-variance option may best reduce overall risk. Both of these
principles seem to be routinely overlooked in public discourse
concerning pandemic risk. We need to chart better paths, and the
faint risk that any such attempt might lead us astray is simply not a
good reason to settle for a disastrous status quo.
3 Human Challenge Trials
The failure to approve Human Challenge Trials for promising
vaccines at the very start of the pandemic offers an especially
clear example of harmful biomedical conservatism. The Moderna
vaccine was designed in mid-January, reported 94.5% efficacy in
mid-November, and was finally authorized for emergency use by
the FDA in mid-December of 2020.16
Vaccine field trials take a comparatively long time, as they re-
quire waiting for a sufficient number of participants to suffer natu-
16Wallace-Wells (2020).
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ral infection to confirm the vaccine’s efficacy relative to placebo.
Human Challenge Trials instead directly expose participants to
a “challenge strain” of the virus, potentially confirming vaccine
efficacy much sooner. Bioethicists have vocally championed Covid
challenge trials on this basis,17 and the advocacy organization 1Day
Sooner <1daysooner.org> enlisted over 30 000 global volunteers,
while their open letter was signed by moral theorists as diverse as
Peter Singer and Christine Korsgaard.18
The obvious case against Covid challenge trials was that they
involve deliberately infecting people with a potentially deadly
virus. That sounds bad, on its face. What if a participant died?
That would, of course, be tragic. Yet, at the peak of the pandemic,
thousands of Americans were dying of Covid every day. Speed-
ing vaccine approval in the slightest (let alone by several months)
could have saved many thousands of lives in the US alone,19 not
17E.g., Eyal, Lipsitch, and Smith (2020) and Chappell and Singer (2020).
18https://www.1daysooner.org/us-open-letter (accessed 4/23/2021).
19Firm estimates here are hard to come by. Economist Tyler Cowen has sug-
gested, as a rough first pass, an estimate of 2000 extra deaths per day of delayed
vaccine approval (https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/20
20/12/how-many-lives-will-be-saved-if-the-fda-had-moved-faster.html,
accessed 5/22/2021). This estimate would need to be adjusted downward insofar
as vaccine manufacturing continued apace even prior to approval. It would need
to be adjusted upwards insofar as early vaccinations slow the spread of the virus,
and so reduce the ‘peak’ and not just the length of the pandemic. My argument
does not hinge on the precise details; it suffices that the expected social gains
from earlier access to vaccines is immense.
14
to mention a sooner end to all the social and economic harms
that accompanied the pandemic.20 Prioritizing the paternalistic
prevention of moderate risks to a few willing volunteers over ev-
erything else at stake here arguably constitutes a kind of moral
insanity.
This judgment does not rely upon controversial utilitarian
premises. For this is not a case of utilitarian sacrifice, violating
the rights of a few for the sake of the many. Challenge trials do
not involve conscripting the unwilling, or deliberately deceiving
participants about the risks. Rather, we’re talking about volunteers
who freely choose to accept the risks in order to immensely benefit
the rest of society. To prevent them from making such a benefi-
cial, autonomously-chosen sacrifice makes about as much sense
as banning altruistic kidney donations (or charitable donations
more broadly). When considerations of autonomy and benefi-
cence both point in the same direction, as they do here, it’s very
hard to see what further considerations could possibly outweigh
20Though less salient and harder to quantify, their significance could well
swamp the direct health costs of the pandemic. As a rough illustration: if you
lower everyone’s quality of life by 1/3 for one year, that translates into over 100
million quality-adjusted life-years lost in the US alone. Even if that exaggerates
the actual costs by a whole order of magnitude, the sheer scale of any non-trivial
population-wide harms remains mind-bogglingly immense.
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their combined force.
We should be especially wary of anti-beneficent paternalism: forc-
ing individuals, for their own good, not to promote the general
good. As a general rule, we should not prevent people from per-
forming beneficent acts that help others more than they harm the
agent themselves. Reasonable people can dispute the conditions
under which individuals might be forced to sacrifice their own
interests to better promote the general good. But forcing them
in a way that is contrary to the general good is straightforwardly
unreasonable. Applied to the present case: it is unreasonable to
oppose Covid challenge trials out of concern for the participants’
interests, or the sheer level of risk that they would be (voluntarily)
undertaking.21
Some might wonder whether our immense uncertainty and
ignorance regarding COVID-19, especially early in the pandemic,
would have undermined the possibility of obtaining genuinely
informed consent. But this rests on a confusion about the nature
of informed consent.22 In addition to consenting to specific well-
21It would also seem inconsistent with how we treat risks in other domains,
such as for volunteer nurses—a point emphasized by Chappell and Singer (2020)
in their discussion of risk parity.
22See Steel, Buchak, and Eyal (2020).
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understood risks, participants can also consent to a procedure that
they understand may expose them to unknown risks. So long as
researchers do not deceive participants, for example by deliberately
downplaying the level of risk involved, there need not be anything
exploitative about conducting such research. Competent adults
freely act in ways that will have unpredictable outcomes all the
time; there is nothing inherently problematic about this.
Granted, it would certainly be unfortunate if some participants
later regretted their decision, or if their consent was the result of
some unwitting confusion. We should try to avoid such outcomes
insofar as we easily can (e.g., by designing clearer consent forms).
But the moral severity of this misfortune should be kept in per-
spective. It is not a grave moral evil (compared to thousands of
deaths and millions of reduced-quality life-years), and the mere
possibility of occasionally imperfect consent is not sufficiently
weighty to register as a serious reason to oppose challenge trials.
Ethical objections23 to Covid challenge trials thus seem to re-
23Here I mean to exclude purely pragmatic objections, e.g., that challenge
trials might take longer to set up than their proponents assume. But note that
some pragmatic objections depend upon false moral assumptions. For example,
worries that challenge trials would not provide evidence of efficacy across all
age ranges falsely assumes that older volunteers could not ethically participate.
Whether to include older participants depends upon how the added value of
more demographically diverse research results compares (in expectation) to the
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veal a staggering lack of moral proportionality. Whatever ethical
considerations might technically be raised against challenge tri-
als, they involve no egregious moral violations, and only the most
egregious moral violations could possibly outweigh the extraordi-
narily strong moral reasons we had to pursue a sooner end to the
pandemic. (Of course, if they wouldn’t actually serve to achieve
this end, then that’s another matter. It is not my task in this paper
to settle such empirical questions.)
Challenge trials could have had other benefits in addition to
speeding initial vaccine approval. For example, given their greater
efficiency, it would have been feasible to test the efficacy of a wider
range of vaccine dosage regimens—including single doses, frac-
tional dosage, “mix and match” doses from different vaccines, and
longer waits between doses—to help inform subsequent vaccine
distribution policy.
Moreover, the basic argument for challenge trials carries over
to non-vaccine research for which the expected social value of the
information gained similarly outweighs the risk of harm to the
higher risk they would face as individuals. If the social value of their participa-
tion is sufficiently high, then their heroic altruism should be straightforwardly
welcomed. In what other context would the default assumption be to ban heroic
acts of immense social value?
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volunteers. Given the scales involved, this condition will generally
be met for any research that has a feasible chance of reducing
the population-wide toll of the pandemic. For example, it could
have been well worth pursuing early research into “variolation”,
or inoculation via low-dose viral infection. In the historical case
of smallpox, variolation reduced fatality rates from 30% down to
1-2%,24 and medical experts have noted that coronavirus symptom
severity seems similarly influenced by initial viral load.25 The
expected value of early-pandemic research into variolation is thus
high, as it safeguards against worst-case scenarios in which we’re
unable to swiftly develop effective vaccines, and it enables policies
of Early Targeted Immunity (see sec. 4). Other challenge trials
might have tested for cross-immunity from cold coronaviruses,
or tested candidate preventative measures such antiseptic nasal
sprays.26 We might expect most such trials to yield negative results,
24https://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/smallpox/sp_variolation.html, as cited
by Robin Hanson in https://www.overcomingbias.com/2020/03/variolation-
may-cut-covid19-deaths-3-30x.html (both websites accessed 5/5/2021).
25Rabinowitz and Bartman (2020). Strikingly, these medical researchers added,
without argument, that “It would be unethical to experimentally manipulate
viral dose in humans for a pathogen as serious as the coronavirus.” I think this
really demonstrates the need for the present paper: ethicists need to push back
against false ethical assumptions that may impede essential pandemic research
and hence impede our overall pandemic response.
26Cf. Stathis et al. (2021). Thanks to Helen Yetter-Chappell for drawing my
attention to these proposals.
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but discovering any cheap, safe, and effective medical interven-
tions early on could have made a big difference—easily sufficient
to outweigh the aggregate costs of all the experimental research.27
So, again, there were no sufficiently weighty moral reasons to pro-
hibit altruists from volunteering to participate in such socially
valuable research.
I would further argue that, in the event that we lack sufficient
volunteers to support such socially valuable but risky research, it
would be ethical to financially compensate participants at whatever
level of payment is necessary to make participation worthwhile
for them. Such payment raises worries about exploitation via “un-
due inducement”—that the prospect of payment risks inducing
poorer individuals to participate against their best interests, un-
dermining their capacity to rationally consent. While we certainly
ought not to deliberately exploit anyone, it’s worth stressing that
27This is worth emphasizing, as I know bioethicists who, in conversation, argue
that the fact that most trials have negative results suggests that we’d be better off
with a heuristic of disallowing research that poses significant risks to participants.
This is fallacious: as normative theorists have long stressed, the best choice in
expectation need not be the option that has the highest probability of being best
(Parfit 1987; Jackson 1991). Even if it were true that 99% of such trials harmed
participants without yielding countervailing benefits, the comparatively small
harms thereby allowed could easily be swamped by the value of even one trial that
results in a medical breakthrough saving thousands of lives. So, a conservative
heuristic that yielded the “best” result (averting small harms) in 99% of cases may
still be disastrous overall, and predictably so.
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reducing (or even eliminating) the benefits to participation seems
like a very backward way to address this worry—it’s unlikely to
be appreciated by would-be participants, after all, and for good
reason: reducing the quality of the options available to them is not
a very helpful thing to do! A more helpful way to address concerns
that participation might be against the interests of the participants
would be to increase the rewards for participation, so that it is more
clearly worthwhile (offering a superior risk premium than one
finds for everyday risky jobs in mining and forestry, say).28 Given
the immense social value of the research, we could—and should—
sufficiently reward the participants for their service as to render it
a “win-win” for all involved.29
It’s again conceivable that, despite our best efforts, some par-
ticipants end up offering imperfect consent. But again, imperfect
consent is merely something that we should try to improve upon
inasmuch as we feasibly can. We should not deliberately exploit
it, but nor must we prevent it at all costs. It would reveal a gross
28Emanuel (2005). Compare: many employers paid bonuses to “essential
workers” early in the pandemic, as compensation for the greater risk they were
now exposed to.
29In terms of ex ante expected value, that is. Obviously the ex post results
cannot be guaranteed, though risks should of course be mitigated as far as
possible by ensuring that the best available medical care is provided, free of
charge, to participants who end up needing it.
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lack of moral proportion to treat the mere possibility of imper-
fect consent as a decisive consideration that takes lexical priority
over all else in a pandemic. In particular, it is not a sufficiently
weighty reason to block socially valuable research that could save
thousands of lives and improve millions more.30
4 Early Targeted Immunity
Something that was largely overlooked in the early stages of the
pandemic was the potential value of a policy of Early Targeted
Immunity for individuals in social roles that entail either an espe-
cially high risk of transmitting the virus to vulnerable populations
(e.g. medical and elder-care workers) or a high social cost to shift-
ing to remote work (e.g. K-12 teachers). Indeed, a wide range of
“essential” service roles, from childcare providers to grocery clerks
and Uber drivers, seem likely to yield disproportionately high
social value from early immunity, greatly slowing the spread of
the virus. Targeted immunity could also be used to contain out-
30It’s worth stressing that this is not a distinctively utilitarian judgment. One
can give weight to non-utilitarian considerations of this kind while agreeing
that it would be unreasonable to give them excessive weight. My claim that we
ought not to give lexical priority to such considerations is a very weak claim,
and should be shared by moderate deontologists, for example.
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breaks via “ring vaccination”: “A [Deliberate Exposure to Induce
Immunity] program that is targeted toward individuals who work
or live in close proximity to recent or anticipated outbreaks could
create a ‘ring’ of immunity that prevents or reduces spread, and
might be able to do so with relatively few participants.” (Streiffer,
Killoren, and Chappell 2021, sec. 3.1)
Early targeted immunity could be provided through viral inoc-
ulation: deliberately exposing volunteers from the target group
to a low dose of the virus, followed by strict quarantine until no
longer infectious.31 Depending upon the results of early research
into variolation, it’s entirely possible that such low-dose exposure
could even be in the medical interests of the volunteers, by pro-
tecting them against the greater risk of an accidental high-dose
exposure. But even if not, it could easily be in the interests of
society as a whole, and it would thus be worth compensating the
participants in order to make it in their overall interest to provide
this social value.32
Given their low risk, young adults might be especially keen to
31Streiffer, Killoren, and Chappell (2021); Crummett (2021).
32See the previous section for discussion of financial compensation and “undue
inducement” objections.
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secure early immunity and subsequently take on essential service
roles (and safely socialize in their time off) rather than being locked
down largely out of fear of the threat they would otherwise pose
to older members of society. Risks could be further reduced by
preceding viral inoculation with experimental vaccination—we
now know that the major Covid vaccines are safe and effective, but
even from the vantage point of our earlier uncertainty, experts
may well have judged that experimental vaccination had high
expected value (with significant potential benefit and minimal risk
of any serious downside) for anyone who was otherwise certain to
become infected with the virus.
This is obviously all speculative. But a central theme of this pa-
per is that high uncertainty alone should not bias us against a pan-
demic policy proposal. The question is whether—taking the full
range of possibilities into account, weighted by their probability—
the expected value of the proposal should be judged positive or
negative on net. This is an empirical question, best answered by
the relevant disciplinary experts. As a philosopher, I restrict myself
to claiming that this is a question that ought to have been asked,
and that we can see this because it’s prima facie plausible that the
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correct expert judgment could well have been that the proposal in
question had immensely positive expected value (however uncer-
tain, or high-variance). Given that this was a reasonable possibility,
we can see that to not even ask the question was to irresponsibly con-
demn to death many thousands who very well might have been
saved by a more careful survey of the policy options, guided by
expert cost-benefit analysis.
5 Vaccine Hesitancy
Perhaps the strongest argument for medical conservatism, at least
so far as vaccine policy is concerned, invokes the fear of vaccine
hesitancy. Already, by early 2021, large swathes of the U.S. public
were irrationally reluctant to become vaccinated, and one might
reasonably fear that any hint of “rushing” the process, or failing
to react strongly to the slightest hint of problematic side-effects,
could have further exacerbated this problem.
I have three main responses to this concern. The first is that, as
a delicate and highly uncertain empirical matter, it should be eval-
uated by relevant disciplinary experts, to feed into a cost-benefit
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analysis. Recall that the FDA waited a whole month after the re-
lease of the successful Moderna trial results to actually approve
the vaccine. Did they consult with sociologists and psychologists
to determine that this would so assuage the vaccine-hesitant that
it would outweigh the thousands of deaths caused by the delay?
When European nations over-reacted to rare blood clots by paus-
ing the AstraZeneca vaccine, did they have better reason to expect
that this would assuage or rather exacerbate vaccine hesitancy?33
While one may always speculate that policies that are bad on the
merits may have sufficiently good extrinsic (“backlash”) effects to
outweigh their intrinsic demerits, policy-makers should be guided
by actual evidence, and it’s far from clear that they were in these
instances. Absent such evidence, it would seem more appropriate
for public health policy to be decided on the basis of the medi-
cal merits rather than ungrounded sociological speculation about
backlash effects.
This conclusion may be reinforced by a second concern, which
is that the integrity of these institutions requires them to avoid
spreading or reinforcing public health misinformation in short-
33For evidence that it had the latter effect, see Deiana et al. (2021).
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sighted attempts to promote public health goals. This follows from
the more general principle that public institutions ought not to
engage in strategic deception of the public.34 The idea that vac-
cine risks outweigh (either empirically or normatively) the risks of
being unvaccinated during the pandemic is an instance of public
health misinformation that is troublingly prevalent in our society.
When public health institutions implement alarmist vaccine sus-
pensions or other forms of vaccine obstructionism on strategic
grounds, this communicates and reinforces the false message that
the vaccine risks warrant such a response. Rather than trying to
manipulate the public by pandering to unwarranted fears, public
institutions have an obligation to communicate accurate informa-
tion and promote the policies that are warranted in light of that
information.
Thirdly, and perhaps most controversially, there’s a moral case
to be made for prioritizing the interests of the “innocent” (reason-
able members of the public who desire earlier access to vaccines
to be able to protect themselves and those around them) over
34One might think this either on the non-consequentialist grounds that it
would violate democratic requirements of respect for the public, or on the
consequentialist grounds that strategic deception tends to be counterproductive
in the long term.
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those of the vaccine-hesitant (who have freely chosen to reject the
available protection).35
To see this most vividly, focus on some particular individual—
call her Sophie—who died from Covid as a result of being deprived
of early access to a vaccine that she strongly wished to take. Her
government’s obstructionism was then causally responsible for her
death: had they not blocked her access to the vaccine, she would
have survived. Moreover, it’s entirely foreseeable that people
will die as a result of such policies, so it further seems that the
government is morally responsible for her death. They have, in
effect, indirectly killed her (and others), by blocking access to life-
saving vaccines.
Now suppose that someone seeks to defend the obstructionist
policy by arguing that it helps to reassure fearful members of
society that the vaccines have been scrupulously investigated and
are safe for them to (eventually) use. Further suppose, for sake
of argument, that delays really would save more lives on net by
35I should stress that this distinction does not require imputing ill will or a lack
of “good faith” investigation on the part of the vaccine hesitant. Many may be
trying their best in a misleading informational environment. Even so, I take it
that their views are objectively unreasonable in light of the available evidence,
rendering subsequent harms they suffer from Covid “avoidable” in the morally
relevant sense. For discussion of the moral principles surrounding avoidable
harm, see Graham (2020).
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winning over vast numbers of the vaccine-hesitant. We can still
ask: is that worth it? Could you justify that to Sophie?
It would be one thing if we had to explain to Sophie that we
couldn’t save her without endangering a greater number of in-
nocent people (that is, people facing comparably grave threats
through no fault of their own). That would seem perfectly un-
derstandable, however unfortunate it might be. But that isn’t the
situation here. Those who refuse vaccines aren’t “innocent” in the
relevant sense, as they’re freely choosing to reject the protection
that’s available (or would be available if not for their unreasonable
attitudes). Those who die of Covid as a result of freely rejecting
vaccines are responsible for this outcome: the heightened risk they
faced was self-inflicted.36 And as a general moral principle, we
should not harm innocent people, like Sophie, merely in order to
convince benighted fools not to harm themselves (Graham 2020).
To further illustrate the principle, suppose that extreme anti-
vaxxers, constituting 10% of the population, strap bombs to their
chests and threaten to kill themselves en masse unless the govern-
ment immediately and permanently outlaws all Covid vaccines.
36This is, of course, compatible with holding that those who misled them also
bear responsibility. Moral responsibility is not a zero-sum game.
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Should we appease them, and let the pandemic continue since it
wouldn’t do as much harm as this mob was threatening to self-
inflict? Surely not. Even if harms to innocent victims are smaller
in magnitude than the threatened self-inflicted harms, the harms
to innocent victims matter more.
And so it goes in the less-extreme case. The vaccine-hesitant
are being foolish and facing self-inflicted risks as a result. It isn’t
right or fair to harm innocent, sensible people in order to protect
fools from self-inflicted risks. It’d certainly be a shame if people
died as a result of their own foolish fears, but it’s even more of
a shame that completely innocent people have died through no
fault of their own. Contra utilitarianism, we should care more
about the latter than the former.
A complication: some innocent individuals may be indirectly
harmed by the vaccine-hesitant getting infected and then spread-
ing the illness to them. So we should build into our analogy that
some innocent bystanders might also get hurt in the blast. If it
would actually save more innocent people to appease the mob,
and if it wouldn’t have bad long-term effects (incentivizing simi-
lar hostage-taking in future)—both big “ifs”!—then it may be that
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appeasement is called for in such special situations. But it would
seem generally unlikely that the necessary conditions would in
fact be met.
So, while we should certainly want to reduce vaccine-hesitancy
all else equal, it won’t typically be ethical to do so via the means of
killing innocent people. And vaccine obstructionism amounts to
killing innocent people. The moral bar for justifying such obstruc-
tion is thus much higher than policy-makers seem to standardly
appreciate.
6 Pandemic Policy Expertise
I want to wrap up this paper with some brief reflections on what
it means to “follow the science”, or more generally, to take expert
opinion appropriately into account when determining pandemic
policy.
It is of course vitally important for policy-makers to work with
accurate empirical information, both about the current state of
affairs and about the possible and likely consequences of candidate
interventions. Scientific experts are the best source we have for
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providing policy-makers with these essential inputs. But, crucially,
science per se tells us nothing about what should be done with these
inputs. Especially when making difficult trade-offs, or evaluating
how to respond rationally to risk and uncertainty, there’s no rea-
son to expect doctors or scientists to be especially well-placed to
respond appropriately to their data.
If we blindly defer to doctors and scientists, the resulting poli-
cies will be distorted by whatever implicit normative bridging
principles they happen to unreflectively hold. These are likely to
be unduly conservative (since most people exhibit a wide range of
conservative biases). They may oppose challenge trials and other
beneficial policies as “too risky”, not because they have a more
accurate conception of what the risks actually are, but because they
lack moral understanding of when risks of that magnitude can be
justified. To ward off bias and ill-considered assumptions, policy-
makers need to feed their empirical data through a robust process
of cost-benefit analysis. It is not enough to one-sidedly consider
potential costs of action, and then lazily assume that the status quo
is automatically superior.
There are philosophers and decision theorists who have spent
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much of their lives thinking carefully about how to make rational
decisions under conditions of uncertainty, and how to go about
making difficult trade-offs in extremely high-stakes contexts. For
policy-makers to wantonly violate all that these experts know
about how to make good decisions is—and should be more widely
appreciated as—every bit as deplorable as wantonly disregarding
accurate scientific inputs into the decision-making process.
Conclusion
We’ve seen that much pandemic policy (and ordinary moral
thought about these policies) is rife with status quo bias. Possible
risks from medical intervention are inflated in perceived moral
significance, while objectively greater risks from the pandemic
are comparatively neglected—even when these status quo risks
involve thousands upon thousands of excess deaths that could
have been prevented. There are presumably systemic reasons to
do with institutional incentives that can help explain the causal
provenance of this moral disaster.37 It will be important for social
37Most obviously: policy-makers are more likely to be blamed if an intervention
goes wrong (resulting in highly salient identifiable victims), whereas they tend
to escape blame for inaction that results in grave preventable harms (many of
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scientists to clarify the causal mechanisms that reinforce status
quo bias in public health policy, and for changes in institutional
design to set us on a better track next time around.38 But a crucial
first step is to make the moral case that change is needed, as our
current institutions have made disastrous and indefensible moral
errors. That first step was the task of this paper. I can only hope
that this conclusion becomes sufficiently widely appreciated—and
acted upon—that we do not end up repeating these mistakes when
the next pandemic strikes.
which may be less salient, or only linkable to the policy decision on a statistical
basis—we cannot identify which particular deaths would have been prevented by
earlier access to vaccines, for example).
38Thanks to Philip Pettit, in personal communication, for stressing this point.
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